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Abstract 
Research has demonstrated that merely imagining an autobiographical event can bring 
about false memories for that event. One explanation for this is that imagination leads 
to the creation and incorporation of visual-imagistic information into the event 
representation. This idea was tested in two experiments in which visual-imagery 
processing was disrupted by the use of Dynamic Visual Noise (DVN). In Experiment 
1, autobiographical memories that were rated as ‘known’ and lacking in event detail 
were subsequently rated as more ‘remembered’ following imagination. In Experiment 
2, imagination led to improbable autobiographical events being rated as more 
believable and vivid. In both experiments, interfering with imagery processing by 
DVN reduced these effects. It was concluded that visual-imagistic processing plays an 
important role in altering the mnemonic status of autobiographical representations.         
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Reducing the Impact of Imagery Processing on False Autobiographical Recollection: 
The Effects of Dynamic Visual Noise. 
False memory defines that class of memories pertaining to cognitive 
representations that are mistakenly considered to have arisen as a result of a real 
experience (Schacter, 1999). Such memories can arise as a result of a number of 
processes that occur both inside and outside the psychological laboratory (Loftus & 
Davis, 2006; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Autobiographical memory refers to 
personal memory about the self and comprises event-specific and more generalised 
knowledge and beliefs (Conway, 2005; Conway, & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Levine, 
2004). Accordingly, false autobiographical memories are recollections about events 
that were not in actual fact experienced. The experiments reported here are concerned 
with the effects of imagination on false autobiographical memory. In particular, the 
role of imagination and the use of dynamic visual noise as a technique to gauge the 
impact of visual imagery processes on recollection and believability of constructed 
events.   
False autobiographical memory 
Recent research has shown that false personal memories occur in real life 
(e.g., Crombag, Wagenaar, & van Koppen, 1996; Loftus & Davis, 2006; Odegard & 
Lampinen, 2004), and can also be created in controlled contexts that allow their 
qualities and determination to be studied.  One particularly well studied technique 
involves investigating the effects on memory of imagining performing non-performed 
actions or experiencing fictitious or unlikely events. For example, Goff and Roediger 
(1998) asked participants to perform a set of simple actions (e.g., unlocking a 
padlock). Subsequently, they were asked to merely imagine performing other actions 
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that were not performed earlier. In a final memory test, it was revealed that the act of 
imagination created false memories for the non-performed actions.  
These imagination inflation effects can also be found for experiences of a 
more personal and autobiographical nature. For instance, Garry, Manning, Loftus and 
Sherman (1996) asked participants to rate their certainty that an event from the past 
had actually occurred to them (e.g., winning a stuffed animal at a carnival). For some 
of these events, they were later guided through an imagination phase in which the 
experimenter led them to picture the events in their minds. Finally, they were again 
asked to rate their certainty that the events had actually occurred to them. Once more, 
it was found that imagination increased the belief in the actuality of the events 
occurring. These effects have been found to be robust and occur across a range of 
experiments varying in stimuli and aspects of procedure (e.g., Brewin & Andrews, 
2016; Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013; Lindner & Echterhoff, 2015; Marsh, 
Pezdek, & Lam, 2014; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). 
Explaining false autobiographical memory 
False autobiographical memories can be explained as resulting from memory 
misattributions within the context of the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). According to this framework, mental 
experiences are attributed to particular sources (e.g., a past experienced occurrence) 
based on the appraisal of the qualities of the mental contents of the experience, the 
context in which the contents are embedded, and how together these are evaluated 
against particular decision criteria, goals and heuristics.  
It has been found that the processes that lead to accurate memory attributions 
can also produce false memories. This is especially the case when the mental 
representation of real and false events share similar characteristics and inappropriate 
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criteria and heuristics are employed to evaluate recalled details (e.g., Allen & 
Lindsay, 1998; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Lyle & Johnson, 2007). In such 
instances, a mental representation might be incorrectly attributed to the past with the 
result being a false autobiographical memory. For example, real (vs. false) memories 
typically have associated with them more perceptual and sensory details (Johnson, 
Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Okado, & Stark, 
2003). However, these qualities can also form part of non-experienced events if 
cognitive activities such as visualising or imagining have played a role in the creation 
or modification of that representation. Consequently, such a representation would be a 
prime candidate for misattribution to a past occurrence rather than imagination. 
It is contended that imagination inflation effects are most likely when sensory-
imagistic records are created during imagination itself; a contention that receives 
support from a number of experiments. For example, it has been found that 
imagination effects are typically greater in participants with higher visual imagery 
abilities (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, Sijsenaar & Spaan, 2000; 
Johnson, Raye, Wang & Taylor 1979). In addition, imagery instructions that guide or 
prompt the use of sensory information, enhance imagination inflation effects (Bays, 
Zabrucky, & Foley, 2015), and can lead to detailed (but false) recollection and 
reduced source discriminability (Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003). Finally, the 
visual perspective from which one imagines an event can also influence the 
magnitude of the inflation effect (Linder & Echterhoff, 2015; Marsh, et al., 2014).  
Further support for the assertion that imagination effects are related to sensory 
processing, is work in neuroimaging that has revealed the neural regions associated 
with such processing are more active on imagination trials that later produce false 
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memories for imagined items attributed to actual presentation (Gonsalves, et al., 2004; 
Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson, 2014).  
Overall, imagination inflation effects can be explained by the SMF in which 
(i) sensory-perceptual attributes are generated and incorporated into the imagined acts 
and, (ii) subsequent memory for real (vs. imagined acts) reactivates those sensory 
attributes and individuals monitor for the presence of such information in order to 
make appropriate memory attributions. Although the background research outlined 
above is consistent with this idea, additional evidence for the importance of sensory-
imagistic information, (in the case of the current experiment, visual-imagistic 
information), would be the finding that the use of a visual interference task disrupts 
inflation effects.          
Dynamic visual noise: Interfering with visual-imagistic processing 
One task shown to be valuable in examining the extent to which visual-
imagistic information is used to perform various cognitive activities is the dynamic 
visual noise (DVN) task (Quinn & McConnell, 1996). The task involves viewing the 
display of a randomly changing array of small black and white squares on a computer 
screen.  It has been previously established that DVN disrupts selectively the 
processing of visual-imagistic information. For example, Quinn and McConnell 
(1996), found that DVN reduced episodic memory for a word-list with instructions to 
use a visual mnemonic, but had no effect when instructed to use a non-visual strategy. 
Subsequent work has extended and refined these findings by demonstrating 
that DVN effects can influence encoding or retrieval (Quinn and McConnell, 2006), 
recognition confidence (Kemps & Andrade, 2012), the free recall and recognition of 
concrete (vs. abstract) words (Parker & Dagnall, 2009), the specificity of 
autobiographical memories (Anderson, Dewhurst, & Dean, 2017), and processing in 
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non-memory tasks that require the use of mental imagery (Dean, Dewhurst, Morris, & 
Whittaker, 2005).  
These findings are explained by the influence of DVN on a component of 
visual short-term memory called the passive visual store (Quinn & McConnell, 1996) 
or visual buffer (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006; Quinn & McConnell, 2006). 
The function of the buffer is to hold and maintain visual and imagery-based 
information in short-term storage. The DVN field has obligatory access to this buffer 
and consequently interferes with the processing of visual representations that are 
currently active (Quinn & McConnell, 2006).  
In summary, the DVN task can be considered a good technique for assessing 
the effects of interfering selectively with visual-imagistic processing on performance 
on other tasks that are hypothesised to involve the use of visual-imagery. 
Accordingly, the DVN task should be able to provide a means to examine the 
contribution of visual-imagery processes to the effects of imagination on 
autobiographical memory.   
Experiment 1. Imagination & DVN effects on ‘remember’ and ‘know’ 
judgements in autobiographical memory.   
Experiment 1 examined the contribution of imagery-based processes to 
‘remember’ and ‘know’ judgements in autobiographical memory (Hyman, Gilstrap, 
Decker, & Wilkinson, 1998). In the Hyman et al. experiments, participants first 
generated a number of ‘remembered’ and ‘known’ autobiographical memories. A 
‘remember’ type memory was defined as one that involved conscious awareness of an 
event or experience that included the presence of much associated details like visual 
images, and the feeling that the memory is veridical. A ‘know’ memory was defined 
as a personal memory, but one that lacked these essential attributes and invoked a 
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feeling of general familiarity rather than the type of detailed attributes associated with 
remembered events (e.g., Gardiner, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; Tulving, 1985). 
Following the generation of these memories, half the participants were asked 
to perform an imagination task that involved picturing each memory and considering 
its sensory qualities. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate each memory on a 
seven-point rating scale ranging from ‘know’ to ‘remember’1. The important finding 
was that imagery (vs. no imagery) led to ‘know’ memories being rated significantly 
closer to ‘remember’ on the response scale. Hyman et al., (1998) explained this as 
arising through the incorporation of visual-imagistic details into the original memory 
producing a form of false recollection.  
Experiment 1 reproduced the main features of the Hyman et al. experiment but 
with the additional factor of the inclusion of the DVN task. Whilst performing the 
imagery (vs. control) task, half of each group of subjects looked at a DVN (vs. Static 
Visual Noise; SVN) display. If visual-imagistic information is important for altering 
the contents of the representation of a memory, then imagination should bring about a 
know-to-remember shift for ‘know’ memories when looking at the static noise field. 
However, such a shift will be reduced or eliminated when viewing a dynamic noise 
field.     
Experiment 1: Method 
 Design 
The design had two independent variables, each manipulated between-
subjects. The first IV was the imagery task (imagery vs. no imagery), the second IV 
was the dynamic noise task (DVN vs. SVN). The dependent variable was the ratings 
of the memories along a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Know, to 7 = 
Remember.   
Visual Imagery, Autobiographical Memory & Dynamic Visual Noise                    9 
 
Participants 
The participants were 92 individuals from the Manchester Metropolitan University2. 
All participants took part on a voluntary basis and were recruited by the 
experimenters and assistants. 
Materials & Apparatus 
 The materials comprised a booklet that contained consent information, 
definitions of ‘remember’ and ‘know’ memories, task instructions, spaces to write 
down descriptions of two memories information and the 1-7, Likert rating scales for 
the DV. Separate pages were used for separate sections of information. 
The DVN task was based on that described by Quinn & McConnell (1996). It 
consisted of a display of 120 X 120 black and white squares each measuring 
approximately 3 mm by 3 mm. In the static noise condition, the ratio of white to black 
squares was 50:50 and the distribution was random across the display. In the dynamic 
noise condition, the squares changed from black to white and vice versa in a random 
manner every 0.25 s. As in the static condition, the ratio of white to black dots was 
maintained at 50:50. In addition, the percentage of dots changing was set to 50% 
(Dean et al., 2005). This produced a change rate of 7200 dots every 0.25 s.  
 A computer was used to present the noise fields during phase 2 of the 
experiment.  
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Hyman et al., (1998). Each participant 
was tested individually in a sound attenuated booth. Participants were informed that 
the experiment would consist of a number of phases but they were not given explicit 
information about the nature of each phase. 
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In phase 1, the participant was given the booklet and was asked to read the 
section that defined autobiographical memories followed by definitions of different 
types of personal memory as ‘remembered’ and ‘known’. Before moving onto the 
next stage, the experimenter ensured that the participant understood the definitions 
provided. The participant was then instructed to turn to the next page where 
instructions were presented for the participant to write down two memories from 
before the age of 10 (one memory from each of the categories: remember and know). 
The order was counterbalanced across the participants. Participants were asked, where 
possible, to include their age, the location, people involved, the activities that 
occurred, and other details. This procedure was similar to that of Hyman et al., (1998) 
and ensured that the participants were engaged in the task and understood the 
instructions; particularly the difference between ‘remember’ and ‘known’ memories.  
In phase 2, participants were randomly allocated into one of the four 
experimental conditions; imagery (vs. no imagery) and DVN (vs. SVN). Those 
allocated to the imagery condition were asked to recall one of their two memories and 
form a mental image of the experience and describe any information concerning the 
sensory qualities of the memory that could be generated or came to mind. Whilst 
doing this they were asked to view a computer monitor displaying the DVN (vs. 
SVN) field. They were told that they should look at the noise pattern throughout the 
whole of the imagination stage and compliance was monitored by the experimenter. 
The participant did this for each of their two memories and was counterbalanced. 
Those participants who were in the no-imagery condition were not required to image 
their memory. Instead, they viewed the DVN (vs. SVN) screen and were asked a 
series of control questions, which were not related to the memories generated earlier. 
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These were general knowledge questions selected randomly from the norms of 
Nelson, and Narens, (1980). 
Following a short pause, participants were directed to the page of the booklet 
that contained the DVs and asked to rate each of their memories on the 7-point Know 
(1)-Remember (7) scale. 
           Following completion of phase 2, the participants were debriefed on the nature 
of the experiment and given the opportunity to ask any questions. All participants 
were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time up until the point 
of the analyses. They were provided with a participant number and contact 
information for the experimenter in case of this eventuality. 
Experiment 1: Results & Discussion 
The rating scores for belief for each type of memory were placed into separate 
2(imagery condition; imagery vs. no-imagery) by 2(noise condition; DVN vs. SVN) 
between-subjects ANOVAs. The descriptive statistics for belief can be seen in Table 
1. For simple main effects results, additional analyses were undertaken to estimate the 
Bayes factor (BF) for that comparison. This provides an estimation of the degree to 
which the results provide support for the experimental hypothesis compared to the 
null hypothesis.  
For the present calculations, the posterior odds supporting the experimental 
hypothesis were used as the numerator and the posterior odds supporting the null 
hypothesis as the denominator (BF10 in previous notation, e.g., Wagenmakers, et al.  
,2018). With these calculations, a BF of 0.3 or less provides substantial evidence for 
the null hypothesis. In contrast, a factor of 3.0 or above provides evidence in favour of 
the experimental hypothesis. Bayes factors that fall in-between are less decisive with 
the weighting in favour of the experimental or null hypothesis dependent on the 
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closeness of the value to either 0.3 or 3.0 (Dienes, 2011, 2014). Following the 
recommendations of some recent papers we used a default (half Cauchy) prior 
distribution with a scaling of r = .707 (e.g., Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & 
Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, et al.  2018). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In relation to ratings of belief, ‘remember’ memories, showed no significant 
effect of either variable or their interaction; F(1, 88) = 0.34, p = .56, p = .004, for 
noise condition, F(1, 88) = 1.19, p = .29, p = .01, for imagination, and, F(1, 88) = 
0.01, p = .91, p < .001, for the interaction. For ‘know’ memories, the main effect of 
noise condition was significant, F(1, 88) = 4.86, p = .03, p = .05. The main effect of 
imagination was also significant, F(1, 88) = 5.53, p = .02, p = .06. Importantly, the 
interaction was significant, F(1, 88) = 6.25, p = .014, p = .066. The interaction was 
assessed by the use of simple main effects at each level of noise. Under SVN, 
imagination produced the predicted effect of increasing belief scores, t(44) = 3.92, p < 
.001 Cohen’s d = 1.14, BF10 = 168.87. However, this increase was eliminated under 
DVN, t(44) = 0.09, p = .92, Cohen’s d = .03. The BF10 for this result was 0.27 
showing evidence more predominantly in favour of the null hypothesis of no 
difference. 
Experiment 1 found that mental imagery produced a “know-to-remember” 
shift in the ratings of memories initially classified as known. However, this shift 
occurred only in the absence of visual interference produced by DVN. To the extent 
that DVN provides a means to interfere selectively with visual-imagistic processing 
(as outlined in the introduction), then the conclusion is that such forms of information 
contribute to the effects of imagination. This finding is important as it demonstrates 
that the key element of imagination is visual in nature and this forms the basis of the 
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meta-cognitive evaluation of the mnemonic representation in-line with the SFM. 
According to that framework, monitoring processes operate on mental contents and 
evaluate the various qualities of the retrieved attributes including perceptual details 
(Johnson, et al., 1993). As perceptual and sensory details are more prevalent in actual 
(vs. fabricated) experiences (Johnson, et al., 1988), then ‘remember’ responses or 
judgments are more likely in representations that contain sensory and perceptual 
detail. If source monitoring is based upon this, then misattribution errors can result 
because imagination can also result in the production of perceptual details.    
If the perceptual details incorporated into the representation are not from the 
original experience, the resulting memory can be labelled a false memory, or to be 
more precise, a false recollection as the recollective details were not present in the 
original retrieval attempt or accurately represent the original experience. However, 
this is not the only explanation. To the extent that repeated retrieval results in 
hypermnesic effects (Erdelyi & Becker, 1974; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978), then the 
perceptual details incorporated into post-imagery representations may reflect sensory 
features that were in fact originally encoded. Thus, when originally recalling a 
‘known’ memory (in phase 1), many perceptual attributes may be missing. However, 
following repeated recall with instructions to imagine (phase 2), may result in the 
activation of the original sensory records that are then incorporated into the final 
representation that is used as basis for judgement. The findings from Experiment 1 
cannot decide between either of these explanations. However, the important point is 
that whatever the processes involved (imagination of visual features not originally 
encoded vs. reactivation of encoded features during imagination), they are sensitive to 
a technique that interferes with the processing of visual-imagistic information. 
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Experiment 2. Imagination & DVN effects on judgements of unlikely childhood 
events.   
Experiment 2 extends the first experiment by examining the effects of 
imagination and DVN using a different paradigm that incorporated events that were 
extremely unlikely to have occurred. In addition, it assessed the effects of imagination 
and DVN on both the believability and vividness responses. The design was based on 
that of Mazzoni and Memon (2003) in which participants were asked to indicate their 
degree of belief in a number of event statements that could/could-not have occurred in 
childhood before the age of ten.  
One of these was labelled a non-occurring event to denote that the incident 
described could not occur. This event was “having a nurse remove a skin sample from 
the little finger”. In the United Kingdom, where the Mazzoni and Memon (and the 
current) experiments were conducted, no such test takes place. Another event was one 
that was very likely to have occurred for the majority of participants and was “having 
a milk tooth extracted by a dentist”. This was labelled as a relatively frequent event as 
it is possible that many participants could believe or find this event highly probable. 
Other events were taken from the Life Events Inventory (LEI) that comprises a 
number of statements referring to plausible childhood life events such as “made a 911 
call” and “won a stuffed animal at the carnival” (Garry et al., 1996). In the usual 
administration of the LEI, participants are asked to rate their belief that these events 
occurred to them before the age of ten. Mazzoni and Memon (2003) found that 
imagination increased belief for the events including the non-occurring incident.      
The question posed for Experiment 2 was whether that effect was dependent 
on the processing of visual-imagistic information. To assess this, an adapted version 
of the Mazzoni and Memon (2003) experiment was used that involved a number of 
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changes. Firstly, the delay between the imagination and final test phase was reduced. 
Secondly, the pre-testing phase for the event items was not used because of concerns 
about participants merely attempting to recall earlier pre-test scores in the final rating 
phase (especially under a reduced delay). Thirdly, the imagination manipulation in 
Experiment 2 was between-subjects rather than within-subjects. All three of these 
alterations increased consistency with experiment 1. Finally, in the Mazzoni & 
Memon experiment, the no-imagination control task involved reading a short text 
describing the event. In Experiment 2, this was changed to listening; reading could 
not be used as participants would be viewing the DVN (vs. SVN) screen.   
Accordingly, participants were exposed to a range of event scenarios, 
including the non-occurring event and others taken from the LEI. Participants were 
asked to imagine or listen to these events under conditions of either SVN or DVN and 
then indicate their judgments about these ‘memories’ in terms of belief and vividness. 
Vividness, although not included in the Mazzoni and Memon (2003) experiment, was 
used here as this has often been associated with the recollective or ‘reliving’ qualities 
of personal memory (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Rubin, 2006) and can provide some 
indication of whether the memory contains sensory qualities usually found in 
experienced autobiographical events.  It was hypothesised that imagination would 
increase belief and vividness judgements but only under conditions of SVN. 
 
Experiment 2: Method 
Design 
The design had two independent variables both manipulated between-subjects. 
The first was the noise condition with two levels; DVN vs. SVN. The second was the 
encoding of the events, with two levels; listening and imagination. The dependant 
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variables were belief and vividness of the memory. Each of the variables were 
measured using an 8-point Likert scale indicating participants level of belief/vividness 
of the memory ranging from 1 to 8. For belief, this spanned from 1 = definitely did 
not happen to me to 8 = definitely did happen to me. For vividness, this spanned 1 = 
not at all vivid to 8 = very vivid.  
Participants 
The participants were 120 individuals from the Manchester Metropolitan 
University who took part on a voluntary basis and were recruited by experimental 
assistants via opportunity sampling.  
Materials & Apparatus 
The materials comprised of a booklet that contained separate sections relating 
to different phases of the experiment. For phase 1, the booklet provided general 
details about the experiment and spaces for demographic information. The general 
details indicated that the experiment involved a number of phases related to personal 
memory and imagination. No information was provided about the particulars of the 
experiment.  
 For phase 2, the booklet had a separate section that contained the response 
variables. These were the event names (but not the descriptions) pertaining to the 
three event narratives (outlined below). The narratives were not presented in the 
booklet because these were to be described to subjects in an auditory manner. These 
titles were followed by two 8-point Likert scales for belief and for vividness. For 
belief, the scale ranged from 1 denoting ‘definitely did not happen to me’ to 8 
indicating ‘definitely did happen to me’. For vividness the scale ranged from 1 
indicating ‘not at all vivid’ to 8 designating ‘very vivid’. Thus, each event statement 
was followed by the two response scales. 
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A set of 3 event narratives (descriptions) were developed, pertaining to the 
non-occurring event of Mazzoni and Memon’s (2003) study (having a nurse remove a 
skin sample from the little finger) and 2 events taken from the LEI of Garry et al 
(1996). The latter included “Got in trouble for calling 999” and “Won a stuffed 
animal at the fun fair”. The two LEI events were counterbalanced so that one 
appeared during the imagination/listen phase and the other appeared only on the final 
test. This was done to assess if recent imagination or viewing DVN had an effect on 
responding even without prior exposure to the event. The event narratives consisted of 
a title (the name of the event) and a short story-like account of the event itself 
including event related details. 
The narratives were created as a result of pilot testing in which a pool of 10 
participants were asked to describe the typical features of these events and the 
experiences that may have occurred for each event statement. That the non-occurring 
event was not experienced by the participants was not considered to be problematic as 
the descriptions that were elicited required only the generation of information that 
might have been plausibly encountered. Thus, the production of such a scenario, 
could be achieved by making use of pre-exiting knowledge about nurses, 
examinations and other medical themes. On the basis of the information generated, 
common features were then identified by the experimenters from which short 
narratives were created. The event narratives were constructed to be of similar length 
and recorded into audio files that lasted approximately 60 s each (including pauses). 
These narratives were not printed in the booklets but only presented in audio format in 
phase 2 of the experiment. The DVN task was the same as that described in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Visual Imagery, Autobiographical Memory & Dynamic Visual Noise                    18 
 
Procedure 
The procedure broadly followed that of Mazzoni and Memon (2003). All 
participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated booth and were allocated 
randomly to the conditions. Participants were informed that the experiment would 
consist of a number of phases but they were not given explicit information of the 
nature of those. 
In phase 1, the participant was provided with the booklet relevant to their 
assigned condition. It contained general information about the experiment (such that it 
involved a number of phases related to memory and the ability to imagine) but did not 
reveal any information pertaining to the particulars or more precise details.  
Following this, participants were instructed to turn to a separate page in the 
booklet and read the instructions that indicated that they would be required to view a 
computer monitor displaying either the SVN or DVN field depending on the condition 
to which they had been allocated. Additionally, they were informed that whilst 
viewing the screen, they would be asked to either imagine or simply listen to the event 
narrative.  
The experimenter then asked the subjects to face the computer screen 
displaying either SVN or DVN. Once the participants were viewing the display, the 
audio files of the event narratives were started. For those in the listen condition, the 
instructions requested listening carefully to the narrative while maintaining visual 
gaze on the screen. For those allocated to the imagine condition, the instructions 
requested imagining the scenario and picturing as much of the content as possible in 
their minds eye. Each event narrative played for approximately 60 s. Compliance with 
instructions to maintain gaze on the screen was observed by the experimenter. The 
order of presentation of the narratives was counterbalanced.  
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Following exposure to the two event narratives, there was a short pause (as in 
experiment 1), and then participants were asked to turn to the section of the booklet 
that contained the DVs. For each narrative, a separate page was used. Each narrative 
was indicated by its name (not the description of the event narrative) followed by two 
8-point scales to rate level of belief and vividness for each narrative. 
Once the participant had completed the set of scales, they were provided with 
participant numbers, a contact email address and were debriefed and informed of their 
right to withdraw at any point up to a particular date.  
Experiment 2: Results & Discussion 
The analyses for each memory type and for each DV were entered into 
separate 2(imagery condition; imagery vs. no-imagery) by 2(noise condition; DVN vs. 
SVN) between-subjects ANOVAs. The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
For belief in the non-occurring event, the main effect of noise condition was 
significant, F(1, 116) = 8.37, p = .005, p = .07. The main effect of imagination was 
not significant, F(1, 116) = 1.06, p = .30, p = .019, however the interaction was 
significant, F(1, 116) = 4.87, p = .029, p = .04.  
The interaction was assessed by the use of simple main effects at each level of 
the noise condition. In the SVN condition, imagination increased ratings of belief, 
t(58) = 2.08, p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.53, BF10 = 3.04. Under DVN, no effect of 
imagination was observed, t(58) = 0.94, p = .35, Cohen’s d = 0.26, BF10 = 0.17. The 
direction of the means was also in the opposite direction.  
For vividness ratings for the non-occurring event the main effect of 
imagination was close to significance, F(1, 116) = 3.36, p = .07, p = .03, the main 
effect of noise was significant, F(1, 116) = 8.74, p = .004, p = .07, and the 
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interaction was close to conventional levels of significance, F(1, 116) = 3.36, p = .07, 
p = .03.  
Given the importance of the interaction, this was assessed further by the use of 
simple main effects at each level of the noise condition. In the SVN condition, 
imagination increased ratings of vividness t(58) = 2.27, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 0.58, 
BF10 = 4.27. Under DVN, no effect of imagination was observed, t(58) = 0.001, p > 
.05, Cohen’s d = 0.01, BF10 = 0.31.   
For belief in the LEI when exposed, this produced a main effect of noise 
condition, F(1, 116) = 29.22, p < .001, p = .20. The main effect of imagination was 
not significant, F(1, 116) = 0.68, p = .41, p = .006. However, the interaction was 
significant, F(1, 116) = 12.12, p = .001, p = .095. 
Simple main effects were conducted at each level of the noise condition. This 
produced a significant effect of imagination under SVN, t(58) = 3.10, p = .003, 
Cohen’s d = 0.80, BF10 = 24.97, indicating higher ratings of belief following 
imagination. Under DVN, the difference was smaller, in the opposite direction and 
only close to conventional levels of significance, t(58) = 1.85, p = .07, Cohen’s d = 
0.37, BF10 = 0.01. 
For ratings of vividness in the LEI when exposed, this produced a main effect 
of noise condition, F(1, 116) = 35. 91, p < .001, p = .24. The main effect of 
imagination was not significant, F(1, 116) = 2.61, p = .11, p = .022. However, the 
interaction was significant, F(1, 116) = 13.06, p < .001, p = .10. 
 Simple main effects were conducted at each level of the noise condition. This 
produced a significant effect of imagination under SVN, t(58) = 3.44, p = .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.87, BF10 = 57.09, indicating increased ratings of vividness following 
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imagination. However, the difference was not significant under DVN, t(58) = 1.54, p 
= .13, Cohen’s d = 0.4, BF10 = 0.11, and the difference was in the opposite direction. 
For belief in the LEI when not exposed (baseline condition), this produced no 
main effect of noise condition, F(1, 116) = 0.30, p = .58, p = .003, no main effect of 
imagination, F(1, 116) = 1.12, p = .29, p = .009, and no interaction, F(1, 116) = 
0.09,  p = .77, p = .001. For vividness ratings in the LEI when not exposed this 
produced no main effect of noise condition, F(1, 116) = 0.45, p = .50, p = .004, no 
main effect of imagination, F(1, 116) = 0.002, p = .96, p < .001, and no interaction, 
F(1, 116) = 0.05,  p = .82, p < .001. 
Additional analyses were performed to assess the relationship between the 
vividness and belief scores in each of the conditions for each event type3. The Pearson 
product moment correlations can be seen in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
All relationships were positive and significant to below p < .001 (largest p was 
for the LEI baseline under SVN and listen condition). To assess the significance of 
any differences between the correlation values across the conditions, Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformations were computed. To avoid an excessive number of comparisons, only 
two contrasts (imagination vs. listen) were assessed for each event-type for each level 
of the noise conditions and was thus in-line with the simple comparisons made 
following the ANOVAs. The results can be seen on the right half of Table 3. The only 
difference that achieved conventional significance was that for the LEI exposed event 
under imagination, in which the relationship between belief and vividness was 
marginally higher.    
Overall, Experiment 2 found results congruent with Experiment 1. Namely, 
imagining an event increased belief in that event and reported vividness. However, the 
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effect was reduced in the presence of a DVN field. Although the magnitude of the 
inflation effect was smaller for the non-occurring event, the difference between listen 
and imagination was eliminated also by dynamic noise. Once more, the important 
point is that the inflation effect was dependent on visual-imagistic processing; when 
such processing attempts were undermined (by DVN) then the inflation effect 
disappeared.  
The use of a non-exposed memory statement (LEI baseline) was used to assess 
the impact that any recent imagination or exposure to a DVN field might have upon 
responding even when the event itself had not been exposed in the initial phase. If 
these factors were to influence ratings for the baseline event, this could indicate the 
operation of response bias. However, neither effects of imagination or DVN were 
found, indicating that the influence of both imagination and dynamic noise are 
specific to the contents of the representations activated during phase 1 of the 
procedure. 
The relationship between belief and vividness was significant across all 
conditions and is similar to other reports that demonstrate positive relationships 
between belief and recollection (e.g., Rubin, 2005; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 
2003). Possibly this reflects the influence of vividness on the beliefs about accuracy 
and is thus consistent with the SFM; the recall of particular (vivid) details is 
considered diagnostic of having experienced an event and this serves to make it more 
believable (Kelley, & Sahakyan, 2003). However, caution needs to be exercised with 
the interpretation of directed of influence as these findings were only correlational.    
General Discussion 
General overview & summary 
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The present research found that imagination can influence judgements about 
the personal past in terms of remembering (vs. knowing) (Experiment 1) and ratings 
of belief/vividness of improbable and plausible events (Experiment 2). Previous work 
has suggested that the effects of imagination on judgements such as these reflect the 
incorporation of visual-imagistic representations into the event or memory narrative. 
The current findings support this hypothesis because techniques that are known to 
impair visual-imagistic processing (i.e., DVN) reduce the effects of imagination on 
such meta-cognitive judgements. This was found across two experiments that 
employed different materials and measurements of belief and judgement of personal 
memories. Overall, the current results indicate that the incorporation of visual-
imagistic information into a “possible” memory narrative, can enhance the 
believability and vividness of that narrative. This outcome is explicable in terms of 
previous conceptualisations of false autobiographical memory and the mechanisms 
that are influenced by dynamic noise fields.   
Theoretical accounts of effects  
The findings obtained in both experiments can be understood from the 
perspective of the SMF and the mechanisms that are hypothesised to underlie DVN 
effects on memory. In relation to the former, the SMF explains memory as the result 
of a number of processes including the retrieval of mental contents, their appraisal, 
monitoring and judgements about the origins of the experience. If visual-imagistic 
information is retrieved, then it is more likely that the experience will be considered a 
true memory. This comes about because the qualities of the retrieved contents are 
appraised and appropriate judgements derived in-line with the appraisal. In this case, 
because on average, real experiences contain more perceptual detail, then an external 
source attribution will occur. Although this may be accurate in many circumstances, it 
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will sometimes be in error if the perceptual details were derived from other sources, 
such as vivid imagining. In the case of the experiments reported here, those details 
could originate from a combination of ‘pure’ imagination (that bore no grounding in 
the original experience) and perceptual details of the original or similar events that 
were reactivated during imagination. For similar events, these visual attributes can 
then be imported to the target memory making that memory seem more vivid and real 
(Lyle & Johnson, 2006). With regard to the first, this might account for the effects 
found in relation to improbable events. This could also apply to known memories in 
combination with the reactivation of encoded visual details. In both cases however, 
DVN reduces the effect because it interferes with the generation of imagistic 
representations.    
The SMF provides a general perspective for considering true and false 
memory, however, more particular frameworks have been proposed within the context 
of false autobiographical memory research. For example, Hyman et al., (1998), 
contend that false personal memories are constructed following a sequence of 
processes involving: (i) accepting a possible memory or narrative as plausible, (ii) 
elaborating on that narrative by the incorporation of additional (including sensory) 
details, and finally (iii) misattributing the imagined construction to an actual event 
(that is, a source misattribution error accountable within the SMF).  
From the perspective of the current work, the target events in Experiment 1 
were self-selected and thus possessed at least some degree of personal plausibility. 
For Experiment 2, the events were selected by the experimenter to at least possess 
some degree of general plausibility (even the non-occurring event had some degree of 
plausibility). Consequently, the effects of imagination (and the influence of DVN) as 
reported here relate to event constructions that have some degree of credibility or 
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believability in the first instance. In this context, it is unlikely that DVN influences 
judgements of plausibility per-se. Rather, it is within the second stage of Hyman et 
al’s framework that DVN is likely to exert its effects; through interfering with the 
elaboration or creation of a narrative. More specifically, by interfering with the 
generation of visual-imagistic information, subsequent source monitoring decisions 
are made easier as less event-specific sensory details are present in the final 
representation.    
The use of DVN in the context of visual imagination inflation effects provides 
some theoretical leverage on the nature of such imagery effects.  Imagery and 
perceptual information can be represented in terms of abstract codes, that themselves 
do not possess the properties of images or in a form that is non-propositional or 
depictive (picture-like) (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015). DVN has 
been shown to exert effects primarily in tasks that require the generation of mental 
images during encoding or retrieval in their non-propositional form whilst being 
processed by the visual buffer (Pearson, 2001; Quinn & McConnell, 2006).  
According to this account, the visual buffer is responsible for the representation of 
conscious visual images that are short-lived unless refreshed and can be acted upon by 
the central executive according to current goals (Quinn & McConnell, 2006).  
Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn from the current results is that 
visual-imagery based inflation effects are initially dependent on representations 
processed by the visual buffer. During this period, these representations are 
vulnerable to external visual interference and hence disruption by a DVN field. 
However, as these representations decay rapidly, the longer-term effects must be due 
to their storage in alternative forms.      
Potential problems & other research considerations 
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The introduction outlined a distinction between episodic and semantic 
autobiographical memories. The former includes event-specific details that are less 
prevalent in the latter (Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012). 
This distinction is also embodied in other theoretical conceptions. For example, the 
difference between ‘remember’ and ‘know’ responses (Conway, Collins, Gathercole, 
& Anderson, 1996; Tulving, 1985), or between ‘memory’ and ‘belief’ (Mazzoni, & 
Kirsch, 2002). The first of each of these distinctions refers to remembered experiences 
with details of the occurrence of the events. The second refers to knowledge without 
recollection or to the degree of certainty regarding the occurrence of an event (e.g., 
rating the likelihood that some experience or event has really happened). Thus, 
knowing and beliefs, in this context are like personal semantic memories that are 
retrieved without detail. It has been argued that many of the experiments into false 
autobiographical memories are mainly concerned with the latter (Brewin & Andrews, 
2016; Mazzoni, & Kirsch, 2002).    
Considered within this context, the false autobiographical memories produced 
in previous studies on imagination inflation, and the ones created here, may more 
accurately be described as false beliefs or false know responses about the self. For 
example, in Experiment 1, although there was shift from know to remember, the 
inflated ratings only just reached the midpoint of the scale and were lower than the 
ratings for genuine remember type memories. In Experiment 2, although there was 
some shift towards a higher scale rating (e.g., this event did happen to me), the 
responses following imagination were still low; typically below the midpoint of the 
scale with the exception of the imagination and SVN condition for the LEI exposed 
memory. Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether imagination techniques can 
produce effects that are more episodic-like and if these can also be reduced by DVN. 
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Future research considerations 
 In both of the experiments reported here, DVN was applied during the 
imagination phase. Previous, work has demonstrated that DVN can indeed act upon 
the retrieval of imagistic representations (Dean et al., 2005; Parker & Dagnall, 2009) 
and future work might want to consider the application of DVN at the retrieval or 
judgement phase when participants actually make their responses about the 
believability or vividness of their memories.       
 In the current experiments the delay between the imagination and judgement 
phase was relatively short. As previous work has used both short (e.g., Hyman et al., 
1998; Libby, 2003) and longer delays (e.g., Garry et al., 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 
2003), an important consideration would be to assess the extent to which the effects of 
DVN continue over longer delays. 
  In this research, the focus was on the role of visual imagination as this is of 
special importance due to the predominance of visual processing in models of 
autobiographical memory (e.g., Greenberg, & Rubin, 2003; Greenberg & Knowlton, 
2014; Rubin, 2006). However, as autobiographical memories are complex multimodal 
representations (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007), it will be valuable for future work to 
consider whether modality-specific interference can be found.  
 In both of the current experiments, the descriptions of the imagined 
information during the imagery trials was not recorded but could be considered in 
future work4. Particularly, with the intent to assess whether the amount and type of 
descriptions differ under DVN (vs. SVN) conditions, and how this relates to the 
magnitude of inflation effects.   
Conclusion  
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 The two experiments described here indicate that DVN can reduce the 
magnitude of imagery inflation effects. This was found using different experimental 
procedures and different memory elicitation/induction techniques. The findings 
extend the range of situations in which DVN effects can be found and demonstrate 
that imagination inflation effects are, in part, dependent upon the generation and use 
of visual imagery-based processes and representations.   
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Footnotes 
1. In Hyman et al. (1998) and Experiment 1 of the current paper, the distinction 
between remembering and knowing was treated initially in a dichotomous 
manner (generating memories that were either ‘remembered’ or ‘known’) and 
later in a continuous manner (using the 7-point rating scale with 1 as known 
and 7 as remember). For readers familiar with dual-process models of memory 
this ‘cross-classification’ and usage of such terms may seem unwarranted. 
This is because extant theorising about the basis of memory has treated these 
two forms of memory as qualitatively distinct (dual process) (Yonelinas, 
2002), or varying along a continuum of memory trace strength (single process) 
(Dunn, 2004).   
However, the purpose of the current work (and Hyman et al., 1998) was not to 
demarcate between dual (vs. single) process accounts of memory. Rather, the 
initial memory generation and classificatory task, was to allow the production 
of different types of memory that varied in terms of the details that each 
contained. For a memory that is generated as ‘known’ the rating of this will 
likely vary along a continuum depending upon the relative familiarity of the 
memory. Irrespective of this, the ratings will be more towards the ‘know’ end 
of the continuum. This was the outcome in Hyman et al., (1998) and 
Experiment 1 of the present research.  
For memories classified as ‘remembered’ it might be conjectured that all 
ratings should be designated a maximum of 7 on the rating scale (because if a 
memory is indeed ‘remembered’ and thus rich in episodic detail, then it should 
not receive a rating score of less than 7). However, remembering (recollection) 
is not necessarily an all or none process (Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 
2010). Thus, individuals can remember more or less of the precise episodic 
details of an event and this will translate into variations in the responses on the 
rating scale; albeit with all such memories being rated as high on the response 
sale continuum (Yonelinas et al., 2010). This was likely reflected in Hyman et 
al., (1998) and Experiment 1 of the current work in which the mean of the 
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‘remembered’ memories was less than 7 and rated as 5.79 (see the upper half 
of Table 1 in the result section).     
2. Sample sizes were determined based on previous DVN research. The stopping 
rule was when we reached a minimum of 20 per-between subject group or the 
end of an academic year, whichever produced the most. The maximum was 
30.  
3. These analyses were not planned but were suggested by a reviewer. We 
performed these as it was felt that such relationships might prove to be of 
interest in the context of this and prior work on autobiographical memory.     
4. For Experiment 2, this was partly precluded by the fact that the participant was 
listening to the recorded description of the events. Of course, it could have 
been possible to play the event narrative via headphones and record any verbal 
elaborations. However, doing this may have made the task unduly complex. 
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TABLE 1 
Mean belief rating (and SD) as a function of interference condition, memory type and imagination 
condition. 
 
      Interference Condition 
 
 
 Memory Type    Static           Dynamic 
 & Imagination Condition     
 
 
Remember 
   
Imagination  5.74 (0.86)  5.65 (0.93) 
  No Imagination  5.95 (0.87)  5.83 (0.87) 
 
Know 
  Imagination  4.17 (1.07)  2.78 (1.28) 
  No Imagination  2.74 (1.38)  2.83 (1.82) 
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TABLE 2 
Mean belief & vividness rating (SD) as a function of interference condition, memory type and 
imagination condition. 
 
      Interference Condition 
 
 
 Memory Type    Static           Dynamic 
 & Imagination Condition     
 
      Belief 
Non-occurring  
   
Imagination  3.40 (2.34)  1.67 (1.56) 
  No Imagination  2.30 (1.70)  2.10 (1.74) 
 
LEI exposed 
 
  Imagination  5.83 (1.86)  2.60 (1.94)  
  No Imagination  4.26 (2.04)  3.57 (2.11) 
 
LEI baseline   
 
Imagination  3.57 (1.83)  3.23 (2.21) 
  No Imagination  3.87 (2.12)  3.77 (2.42) 
 
 
 
       
Vividness 
 
Non-occurring  
   
Imagination  3.13 (2.43)  1.56 (1.47) 
  No Imagination  1.93 (1.57)  1.57 (1.50) 
 
LEI exposed 
 
  Imagination  5.70 (1.90)  2.33 (1.71) 
  No Imagination  3.87 (2.22)  3.03 (1.81) 
 
LEI baseline   
 
Imagination  3.30 (2.05)  2.97 (2.12) 
  No Imagination  3.20 (2.02)  3.03 (1.97) 
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TABLE 3 
Pearson product moment correlations between belief and vividness ratings as a function of 
experimental condition and Fisher’s r-to-z transformation statistics for correlation comparisons. 
 
                  Interference Condition  Test Statistic 
 
 
 Event Type    Static         Dynamic  z p 
 & Imagination Condition     
 
       
Non-occurring  
   
Imagination  .96  .91  1.54 .12 
  No Imagination  .92  .91  0.23 .82 
 
LEI exposed 
 
  Imagination  .86  .95  1.98 .05 
  No Imagination  .93  .83  1.73 .08 
 
LEI baseline   
 
Imagination  .84  .93  1.61 .12 
  No Imagination  .70  .83  1.18 .24 
 
 
 
       
Note: All p values for the correlations were below .001. As no predictions were made regarding the 
difference between the Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, all p values were two-tailed. 
 
 
 
